A “New Cold War”?
“The silence of slippers is more dangerous than the sound of boots.”
By Louis Perez y Cid
The war in Ukraine has shattered a persistent illusion: that of a Europe definitively removed from the history of power relations.
Beyond the fighting, a long-term confrontation has taken hold between the West and Russia. A confrontation destined to last, with no quick solution or new security order on the horizon.
However, a major war between Russia and NATO remains unlikely. Nuclear deterrence continues to play its role, solidifying red lines and preventing escalation into all-out conflict. But the absence of open war does not mean peace.
Because another war is already here. More discreet, more diffuse. It unfolds in the gray areas: limited military pressure, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, sabotage, attempts to destabilize European societies. A “new Cold War” has taken hold, and we are fully involved in it.
Consequently, one question keeps recurring: does France have enough soldiers? Contrary to popular belief, the answer is generally yes.
The French Army has sufficient personnel for this type of confrontation, provided it fully utilizes all its resources. Comparing our situation to the Ukrainian war of attrition is misleading. France is operating within a collective framework, that of NATO, for the time being, and its mission is not to sustain a protracted war, but to deter, contain, and react swiftly. The active-duty army forms its core. Alongside it, the reserve is becoming essential, particularly for the protection of the territory and the reinforcement of forces in the event of a crisis. The planned doubling of its personnel by 2030 is a major asset, provided that real resources are allocated to it.
But personnel numbers are not everything. The human element is crucial. Supporting military personnel and their families, preserving the balance between service and personal life, and retaining skilled personnel are all just as important as training or equipment.
At the European level, the challenge is less about deploying forces than about sustaining operations over time, replacing losses, securing the territory, and simultaneously addressing hybrid threats in Europe and beyond.
One possible solution, however, is to make greater use of former military personnel who have recently returned to civilian life. Trained and experienced, they could strengthen leadership and add depth to the common defense model, the 34-nation "Coalition of the Willing," provided this reality is politically acknowledged.
The goal, therefore, is not to "win" a war against Russia, but to demonstrate that any aggression would be contained and would be too costly. This credibility, based on strong conventional forces, an intact nuclear deterrent, and public support, remains the best guarantee of peace. The message must be simple, clear, and credible:
those who mess with it get stung.
The war in Ukraine has shattered a persistent illusion: that of a Europe definitively removed from the history of power relations.
Beyond the fighting, a long-term confrontation has taken hold between the West and Russia. A confrontation destined to last, with no quick solution or new security order on the horizon.
However, a major war between Russia and NATO remains unlikely. Nuclear deterrence continues to play its role, solidifying red lines and preventing escalation into all-out conflict. But the absence of open war does not mean peace.
Because another war is already here. More discreet, more diffuse. It unfolds in the gray areas: limited military pressure, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, sabotage, attempts to destabilize European societies. A “new Cold War” has taken hold, and we are fully involved in it.
Consequently, one question keeps recurring: does France have enough soldiers? Contrary to popular belief, the answer is generally yes.
The French Army has sufficient personnel for this type of confrontation, provided it fully utilizes all its resources. Comparing our situation to the Ukrainian war of attrition is misleading. France is operating within a collective framework, that of NATO, for the time being, and its mission is not to sustain a protracted war, but to deter, contain, and react swiftly. The active-duty army forms its core. Alongside it, the reserve is becoming essential, particularly for the protection of the territory and the reinforcement of forces in the event of a crisis. The planned doubling of its personnel by 2030 is a major asset, provided that real resources are allocated to it.
But personnel numbers are not everything. The human element is crucial. Supporting military personnel and their families, preserving the balance between service and personal life, and retaining skilled personnel are all just as important as training or equipment.
At the European level, the challenge is less about deploying forces than about sustaining operations over time, replacing losses, securing the territory, and simultaneously addressing hybrid threats in Europe and beyond.
One possible solution, however, is to make greater use of former military personnel who have recently returned to civilian life. Trained and experienced, they could strengthen leadership and add depth to the common defense model, the 34-nation "Coalition of the Willing," provided this reality is politically acknowledged.
The goal, therefore, is not to "win" a war against Russia, but to demonstrate that any aggression would be contained and would be too costly. This credibility, based on strong conventional forces, an intact nuclear deterrent, and public support, remains the best guarantee of peace. The message must be simple, clear, and credible:
those who mess with it get stung.